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United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.1 is easily the most im-
portant decision to date involving the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).2
In Atlantic Research , a unanimous Supreme Court restored
CERCLA to its proper place in the environmental cleanup
world, making it “comprehensive” once again.  The opinion’s sig-
nificance lies not in any earth-shaking pronouncements—indeed,
the Court’s analysis is both straightforward and unadorned—but
rather, in its context.  As will be seen below, prior to this deci-
sion, the lower courts had taken a rather tortured path that,
when combined with the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in
Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services, Inc. ,3 left CERCLA’s viabil-
ity as a cost-spreading tool doubtful in most private party
cleanup contexts.  This doubt tended to discourage cleanup as
landowners became nervous about their ability to bring to the
table other entities who may have contributed to the relevant
contamination.
* Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School.  J.D. 1985, Lewis & Clark Law
School; B.A. 1978, University of Rochester.  The author would like to thank Jamie
Saul, Ellen Trescott and Dan Mensher for their  terrific research assistance.  The
responsibility for any errors resides with the author.
1 United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
3 Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
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The specific legal issue in Atlantic Research was one the Su-
preme Court explicitly had left unresolved in Cooper Industries :
whether those who themselves bear potential liability under
CERCLA (often referred to as “potentially responsible parties”
or “PRPs”) may seek cost recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B) of
CERCLA when they engage in voluntary cleanups.4  This issue
hinged on the significance of the “any other person” language in
that provision.5  In short, Atlantic Research argued that the
“other person[s]” to which section 107(a)(4)(B) refers are juxta-
posed in contrast to the parties referenced in section
107(a)(4)(A) (the United States, the states, and Indian tribes).6
From this, the Atlantic Research  Court reasoned that section
107(a)(4)(B) gives private parties a right of cost-recovery regard-
less of whether they themselves may bear potential liability
under CERCLA.7  The United States, by contrast, argued that
the “other person[s]” in section 107(a)(4)(B) are set off against
the liable parties listed in sections 107(a)(1)-(4).8  Thus, accord-
ing to the government’s logic, those who bear liability themselves
would be precluded from seeking cost recovery.
The Supreme Court unanimously sided with Atlantic Re-
search, determining that “the plain language of subparagraph (B)
authorizes cost-recovery actions by any private party, including
PRPs.”9  Noting that CERCLA’s liability scheme sweeps in “vir-
tually all persons likely to incur cleanup costs,” the Court also
pointed out that “if PRPs do not qualify as ‘any other person’ for
purposes of [section] 107(a)(4)(B), it is unclear what private
party would.”10
4 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2333-34.  The term “voluntary” exists nowhere in
CERCLA, but the courts have routinely used it to describe cleanups that companies
or others perform without any binding legal edicts requiring them to do so. See, e.g. ,
id.  at 2334 (referencing “voluntarily incurred response costs”).  Thus, a voluntary
cleanup is one that occurs without any attendant decree or administrative order,
under consent or otherwise. See also infra  Part IV.
5 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2335-36.
6 Id.
7 Id.  at 2336.
8 Id.  at 2335.  These include the current owner and operator of the relevant prop-
erty, anyone who owned or conducted operations on the property at the time of
disposal, anyone who arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances at the prop-
erty, and anyone who transported hazardous substances to the property, if they were
involved in the site-selection process. See  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
9 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2336.
10 Id.
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As a result of Atlantic Research , it is once again clear that even
PRPs have full resort to CERCLA’s liability provisions as a po-
tential means to redistribute some or all of their cleanup costs
among those who bear responsibility for contaminated sites.
Thus, CERCLA will continue to operate as it has for most of the
last twenty-seven years: as the primary statutory driver of both
EPA and private-party cleanup.
This Article will address four points of analysis: (1) a quick
overview of the historical backdrop for the Atlantic Research  de-
cision; (2) a brief description of the facts of the case and its pro-
cedural posture, together with an extended summary of the
Supreme Court’s analysis; (3) a short critique of the opinion; and
(4) a preliminary overview of some of the remaining questions
regarding private party cost recovery and contribution under
CERCLA.11
I
THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP
Congress passed CERCLA in 1980.12  In so doing, it provided
two different categories of plaintiffs with causes of action to re-
cover costs incurred in cleanup efforts.13  First, section
107(a)(4)(A) provides the United States government, states, and
Indian tribes with the authority to sue those deemed responsible
under section 107(a) to recover costs “not inconsistent with” a
document known as the National Contingency Plan (NCP).14
Second, section 107(a)(4)(B) gives “other person[s]” that same
authority, though these persons are required to demonstrate that
their cleanups are necessary and consistent with the NCP.15
Congress has amended CERCLA comprehensively only once,
through the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
11 It should be noted that the author of this Article also wrote an amicus brief for
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (among others) in the Atlantic Re-
search  case. See  Brief for Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council, Atl.
Research , 127 S. Ct. 2331 (No. 06-562), reprinted in  37 ENVTL. L. 411 (2007) [herein-
after NRDC Brief].  Portions of Parts I and III of this Article draw heavily from that
brief.
12 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (2006)).
13 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
14 Id.  § 9607(a)(4)(A).
15 Id.  § 9607(a)(4)(B).
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1986 (SARA).16  Before SARA was passed, the courts unani-
mously recognized that section 107(a)(4)(B) created a right of
cost recovery for private parties who cleaned up sites without
having first been sued by the government, regardless of any po-
tential liability they may have borne under the statute.17  There
was less agreement, however, regarding the availability of contri-
bution rights for those who, in response to a lawsuit, had either
undertaken cleanup measures or reimbursed the government for
its cleanup costs.18
Congress acted against this backdrop in 1986.  In passing
SARA, Congress left section 107(a)(4)(B) unaltered,19 seemingly
preserving the private right of cost recovery.  It did, however,
move to solidify the contribution rights of two groups of parties.
First, in section 113(f)(1), Congress created an express right of
contribution for those who either have been or are being sued
under either section 106 or 107 of CERCLA.20  Additionally, in
section 113(f)(3)(B), Congress did the same with respect to those
who have entered into settlements with either the United States
or an individual state.21
As the Eighth Circuit noted in its consideration of the Atlantic
Research  case, in the wake of SARA, but before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Cooper Industries,  the lower courts began
“directing traffic” between sections 107 and 113(f), generally
steering all CERCLA plaintiffs who were themselves potentially
liable under section 107 toward the contribution-based provi-
sions of section 113(f), rather than the cost-recovery authority
under section 107(a)(4)(B).22  In some cases, this decision was
perhaps justifiable, as parties who had been given contribution
16 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006)).
17 See, e.g. , Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891-92 (9th Cir.
1986).
18 Compare  Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486-90 (D. Colo.
1985) (finding a federal common law right of contribution), and  Wehner v. Syntex
Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (contribution right implied
in section 107(e)(2)), with  United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., No. IP 83-9-C,
1983 WL 160587, at *4 (S.D. Ind. June 29, 1983) (no right of contribution).
19 See  Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 § 107.
20 Id.  § 113(f)(1).
21 Id. § 113(f)(3)(B).
22 Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing
decisions from eleven circuits, including the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Dico, Inc. v.
Amoco Oil Co., 340 F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted , 127 S. Ct. 1144 (2007),
and aff’d , 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007)).
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claims under section 113(f) tried to circumvent that section’s
shorter statute of limitations by availing themselves of the more
favorable limitations period applicable to section 107(a) claims.23
In other cases, however, courts steered parties to contribution-
based remedies despite the fact that they had express claims
under section 107(a)(4)(B), but textually much more problematic
claims under section 113(f).24  Significantly, by the time the Su-
preme Court heard Cooper Industries , at least ten circuits had
determined that PRPs could not bring cost-recovery actions
against other PRPs.25
The courts provided three main rationales for steering parties
toward section 113(f).  First, they cited the above-mentioned con-
cern about the circumvention of section 113(f), often with little
or no analysis regarding the applicability of that section.26  Sec-
ond, they expressed concern that any application of section
107(a)(4)(B) would result in the plaintiff being able to impose all
of the relevant cleanup costs on the defendants under principles
of joint and several liability, in lieu of the equitable allocation
contemplated under section 113(f)(1).27  Third, some expressed
concern that allowing PRPs to bring claims under section
107(a)(4)(B) might eviscerate the contribution protection that
settling parties may have received under section 113(f)(2).28
Tellingly, despite the courts’ reluctance to apply section
107(a)(4)(B) on behalf of parties who bore potential liability
under CERCLA, none of the pre-Cooper Industries  courts de-
nied the plaintiffs a claim.  Even in the absence of a prior or
pending CERCLA action, every circuit addressing the issue held
that potentially liable plaintiffs had either an express contribu-
23 See, e.g. , United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 97-98
(1st Cir. 1994); compare  42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B) (2006) (creating a six-year limita-
tions period for most cost-recovery claims), with  42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) (three-year
period for contribution claims).  The correctness of this approach will be further
discussed in Section IV, infra .
24 See, e.g. , Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1300-03
(9th Cir. 1997) (involving plaintiffs who had cleaned up a site without being sub-
jected to any lawsuit or administrative edict).
25 See supra  note 22 and accompanying text.  Although the Eighth Circuit cited
decisions from eleven circuits, this author is not convinced that one of those cases,
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989), stands for the proposi-
tion for which it was cited.
26 See, e.g. , Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1998); United
Techs. , 33 F.3d at 101.
27 See, e.g. , Bedford Affiliates , 156 F.3d at 424.
28 See, e.g. , United Techs. , 33 F.3d at 102-03.
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tion claim under section 113(f) or an implied contribution claim
either under section 107 itself or some combination of sections
107 and 113(f).29  During that time, even the United States took
the position that potentially liable plaintiffs had claims absent a
prior or pending lawsuit; it argued that these claims arose
through a combined effect of sections 107(a) and 113(f).30  Thus,
neither the courts nor the government questioned whether the
plaintiffs were entitled to relief.  Rather, they merely considered
which provision (or provisions) of CERCLA provided the best
basis for relief.
In Cooper Industries , the Supreme Court held that section
113(f)(1) does not provide a contribution claim if the would-be
plaintiff is not being or has not been sued under CERCLA.31  As
mentioned earlier, the Cooper Industries  Court expressly de-
clined to address the question, whether one who may bear partial
responsibility for a contaminated site, but who cleans it up before
being sued or otherwise compelled to do so, could sue other po-
tentially liable parties for either cost recovery under section
107(a)(4)(B) or implied contribution under section 107.32
The combined effect of Cooper Industries  and the preexisting
law of the circuits cast a chill over private-party cleanups.  At
least ten circuits had already said that PRPs do not have cost-
recovery claims under section 107(a)(4)(B).33  Then, the Su-
preme Court indicated that PRPs do not have claims under sec-
tion 113(f) either, except in narrowly-tailored circumstances.34
The impact on those PRPs who either had engaged or were
thinking about engaging in voluntary cleanups seemed all too ap-
29 See, e.g. , Bedford Affiliates , 156 F.3d at 423-24 (plaintiff who had entered into
an informal administrative agreement with the state had a claim under section
113(f)(1)); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d
769, 776 (4th Cir. 1998) (one who has received unilateral orders from both the state
and EPA may proceed under section 113); Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron
& Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 351-52 (6th Cir. 1998) (the recipient of a unilateral
order under section 106 has a claim under the combined effect of sections 107(a) and
113(f)); Sun Co. (R&M) v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1190-91 (10th Cir.
1997) (same as Centerior); Pinal Creek , 118 F.3d at 1300-02 (one who engages in a
voluntary cleanup has a claim under a combination of sections 107(a) and 113(f));
Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 768-69 (7th Cir. 1994) (a unilateral
order recipient has a contribution claim under section 113(f)(1)).
30 See, e.g. , Centerior , 153 F.3d at 350.
31 Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 168 (2004).
32 Id.  at 168-71.
33 See supra  text accompanying note 25.
34 Cooper Indus. , 543 U.S. at 168.
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parent and was duly noted by practitioners, academics, and
courts.35  While it is impossible to quantify the precise impacts of
this chill, in terms of cleanups either cancelled or scaled back, it
is clear that private party cleanups traditionally have constituted
a significant percentage of the overall CERCLA cleanup world.36
Limiting the ability of landowners to spread the cleanup costs
among others who played a part in causing the relevant contami-
nation was bound to have a dampening effect.
Remarkably, after Cooper Industries  was decided, three cir-
cuits, including the Eighth Circuit in Atlantic Research , agreed to
revisit their earlier holdings regarding the inapplicability of sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B) in the voluntary cleanup context.37  Even more
remarkably, all three of them reversed course to find that even
potentially liable parties have such claims.38  By contrast, in E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. United States , the Third Circuit
35 See, e.g. , Richard O. Faulk & Cynthia J. Bishop, There and Back Again: The
Progression and Regression of Contribution Actions Under CERCLA , 18 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 323, 324-25 (2005); JEFFREY G. MILLER & CRAIG N. JOHNSTON, THE
LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL AND REMEDIATION: CASES, LEGISLATION,
REGULATIONS, POLICIES 573-78 (Thompson/West 2d ed. 2005); Syms v. Olin Corp.,
408 F.3d 95, 106 n.8 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that, taken together, Cooper Industries
and Bedford Affiliates  “might discourage PRPs from voluntarily initiating clean-up,
contrary to CERCLA’s stated purpose[s]”).
36 In the process of writing its amicus brief in Atlantic Research , the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council reviewed all CERCLA decisions appearing in Westlaw that
were decided between 1995 and 2000.  NRDC Brief, supra note 11, at 420 n.12.  In
reviewing these decisions, which involved 364 contaminated sites, it determined that
210 of these (nearly fifty-eight percent) involved cases that would not meet the re-
quirements of section 113(f). Id.  Even this picture, however, does not begin to
convey the full impact that CERCLA has outside of the realm of cases that would
qualify under section 113(f).  It has been noted that “private-party CERCLA actions
are significant not only for the numbers of cases they generate, but also for the
nature of the problems addressed in those cases.” MILLER & JOHNSTON, supra  note
35, at 563-64.  While the EPA and the states tend to focus on only the highest-prior-
ity sites, private parties often deal with smaller-scale contamination problems. Id.  at
564.  The net result is that these private-party actions “have the effect of dramati-
cally expanding the scope of the CERCLA program.” Id.  at 563.  While responsibil-
ity for the vast majority of these cleanups may be resolved without resorting to the
courts, that does not mean they would happen without CERCLA.  In many cases, it
is the underlying threat of such an action that convinces those responsible to come
to the table.
37 Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coat-
ings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 828-31 (7th Cir. 2007); Atl. Research Corp. v. United States,
459 F.3d 827, 829-31 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted , 127 S. Ct. 1144 (2007), and aff’d ,
127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90,
97-100 (2d Cir. 2005).
38 Metro. Water , 473 F.3d at 834-37; Atl. Research , 459 F.3d at 834-37; Consol.
Edison Co. , 423 F.3d at 100.
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found that Cooper Industries  did not provide an adequate basis
for reconsidering its prior position.39  Coincidentally, two of the
first four cases that rose to the appellate level in the wake of
Cooper Industries  involved the United States as a defendant (At-
lantic Research  and DuPont).  Perhaps motivated by this odd cir-
cumstance, the government changed course—for the first time
taking a position that neither it nor any appellate court had ever
embraced—that those who voluntarily clean up contaminated
properties have no claims against other PRPs under CERCLA
unless they themselves have first been sued under the statute
(which would qualify them for a claim under section 113(f)).40
This split in the circuits represented by the three circuits that
reversed course, on the one hand, and DuPont , on the other, set
the stage for the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Atlantic
Research .
II
ATLANTIC RESEARCH
Atlantic Research  involved a company that contaminated land
in the course of retrofitting rocket motors for the United
States.41  After cleaning up the site, it sought to recover some of
its cleanup costs from the United States under section
107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA on the theory that the government
also bore liability under section 107(a).42  The district court
granted the government’s motion to dismiss, relying on the
Eighth Circuit’s pre-Cooper Industries  precedent, Dico, Inc. v.
Amoco Oil Co .43  The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that
Cooper Industries  undermined the logic of Dico .44
39 E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 538-39 & n.27
(3d Cir. 2006), cert. granted and judgment vacated , 127 S. Ct. 2971 (2007).
40 The government apparently first advanced in full form the legal theories it ulti-
mately urged upon the Supreme Court in Atlantic Research in an amicus brief it
submitted to the Seventh Circuit in Metropolitan Water . See  Brief of the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 10-13, Metro. Water , 473 F.3d 824 (No. 05-3299).  Inter-
estingly, the United States did not develop the same arguments in its briefing at the
Eighth Circuit level in Atlantic Research  itself.  Instead, it focused its arguments on
negating Atlantic Research’s implied contribution theory. See  Brief of the Appellee
at 16-17, Atl. Research , 459 F.3d 827 (No. 05-3152).
41 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2335.
42 Id.
43 Id. (referencing Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 340 F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 2003)).
44 Atl. Research , 459 F.3d at 829 & n.2, 830 & n.4.
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Once the issue reached the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas,
writing for a unanimous Court, analyzed the statute in two steps.
First, he interpreted section 107(a) independent of the rest of the
statute.45  Next, he addressed the government’s argument that
the perceived tension with section 113(f) should influence the
Court’s interpretation of section 107(a)(4)(B).46
To set the stage for consideration of the Court’s section 107(a)
discussion, it is worth summarizing the relevant portions of that
subsection.  Section 107(a) identifies four categories of liable par-
ties under CERCLA, including: (1) the owner and operator of
the relevant facility; (2) anyone who owned or operated the facil-
ity when the disposal occurred; (3) anyone who arranged for dis-
posal of hazardous substances at the site; and (4) transporters, if
they selected the site to which to bring the relevant substances.47
It further provides that, subject only to the defenses set forth in
section 107(b), these parties “shall be liable for — (A) all costs of
removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan; [and] (B) any other necessary costs of
response incurred by any other person consistent with the na-
tional contingency plan . . . .”48
In analyzing these provisions, the Court first stressed that the
statute must be read as a whole.49  Applying this maxim, the
Court determined that:
[T]he language of subparagraph (B) can be understood only
with reference to subparagraph (A).  The provisions are adja-
cent and have remarkably similar structures.  Each concerns
certain costs that have been incurred by certain entities and
that bear a specified relationship to the national contingency
plan.  Bolstering the structural link, the text also denotes a re-
lationship between the two provisions.  By using the phrase
“other necessary costs,” subparagraph (B) refers to and differ-
entiates the relevant costs from those listed in subparagraph
(A).  In light of the relationship between the subparagraph, it
is natural to read the phrase “any other person” by referring
to the immediately preceding subparagraph (A), which per-
mits suit only by the United States, a State, or an Indian tribe.
The phrase “any other person” therefore means any person
45 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2335-37.
46 Id.  at 2337-39.
47 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
48 Id.
49 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2336 (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S.
215, 221 (1991)).
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other than those three.  Consequently, the plain language of
subparagraph (B) authorizes cost-recovery actions by any pri-
vate party, including PRPs.50
The Court went on to point out that the government’s reading
of the “any other person” language would belie the symmetry
between the two subparagraphs:
The Government’s interpretation makes little textual sense.
In subparagraph (B), the phrase “any other necessary costs”
and the phrase “any other person” both refer to anteced-
ents–“costs” and “person[s]”–located in some previous statu-
tory provision.  Although “any other necessary costs” clearly
references the costs in subparagraph (A), the Government
would inexplicably interpret “any other person” to refer not to
the persons listed in subparagraph (A) but to the persons
listed as PRPs in paragraphs (1)-(4).  Nothing in the text of
§ 107(a)(4)(B) suggests an intent to refer to antecedents lo-
cated in two different statutory provisions.  Reading the stat-
ute in the manner suggested by the Government would
destroy the symmetry of §§ 107(a)(4)(A) and (B) and render
subparagraph (B) internally confusing.51
Justice Thomas also noted that, given the breadth of CER-
CLA’s liability scheme, the government’s reading of section
107(a)(4)(B) would have stripped that provision of virtually all
operative effect:
[T]he statute defines PRPs so broadly as to sweep in virtually
all persons likely to incur cleanup costs.  Hence, if PRPs do
not qualify as “any other person” for purposes of
§ 107(a)(4)(B), it is unclear what private party would.  The
Government posits that § 107(a)(4)(B) authorizes relief for
“innocent” private parties-for instance, a landowner whose
land has been contaminated by another.  But even parties not
responsible for contamination may fall within the broad defi-
nitions of PRPs in §§ 107(a)(1)-(4).  The Government’s read-
ing of the text logically precludes all PRPs, innocent or not,
from recovering cleanup costs.  Accordingly, accepting the
Government’s interpretation would reduce the number of po-
tential plaintiffs to almost zero, rendering § 107(a)(4)(B) a
dead letter.52
The Court also responded to the government’s argument that
Atlantic Research’s interpretation would create a statutory re-
dundancy in section 107(a)(4)(B).  As explained by Justice
Thomas:
50 Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
51 Id.
52 Id.  at 2336-37 (footnote and citations omitted).
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According to the Government, our interpretation suffers from
[an] infirmity because it causes the phrase “any other person”
to duplicate work done by other text.  In the Government’s
view, the phrase “any other necessary costs” “already pre-
cludes governmental entities from recovering under”
§ 107(a)(4)(B).  Even assuming the Government is correct, it
does not alter our conclusion.  The phrase “any other person”
performs a significant function simply by clarifying that sub-
paragraph (B) excludes the persons enumerated in subpara-
graph (A).  In any event, our hesitancy to construe statutes to
render language superfluous does not require us to avoid sur-
plusage at all costs.  It is appropriate to tolerate a degree of
surplusage rather than adopt a textually dubious construction
that threatens to render the entire provision a nullity.53
In addressing the interface between sections 107(a) and 113(f),
the Court turned to the concerns that had led the lower courts to
“direct traffic” toward section 113(f); i.e., that allowing PRPs to
pursue cost recovery would allow them to circumvent section
113(f)’s shorter statute of limitations at will, that it would inap-
propriately allow plaintiff PRPs to use joint and several liability
to impose all of the liability onto defendant PRPs, and that it
would eviscerate contribution protection that prior settling par-
ties may have received under section 113(f)(2).54
The Court found the first of these concerns to be baseless, at
least in the context of voluntary cleanups.55  First, it noted that it
already had recognized in Cooper Industries  that sections 107(a)
and 113(f) provide “clearly distinct” remedies.56  Second, citing
both CERCLA and Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court expanded
on the differences between cost recovery and contribution, even-
tually summarizing its discussion in the following terms:
Section 113(f)(1) authorizes a contribution action to PRPs
with common liability stemming from an action instituted
under § 106 or § 107(a).  And § 107(a) permits cost recovery
(as distinct from contribution) by a private party that has itself
incurred cleanup costs.  Hence, a PRP that pays money to sat-
isfy a settlement agreement or a court judgment may pursue
§ 113(f) contribution.  But by reimbursing response costs paid
by other parties, the PRP has not incurred its own costs of
response and therefore cannot recover under § 107(a).  As a
result, though eligible to seek contribution under § 113(f)(1),
53 Id.  at 2337 (citation omitted).
54 Id. ; see supra  text accompanying notes 22-28.
55 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2337-38.
56 Id.  at 2337 (quoting Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., 543 U.S. 157, 163 n.3
(2004)).
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the PRP cannot simultaneously seek to recover the same ex-
penses under § 107(a).57
While acknowledging that this reasoning does not resolve all
issues regarding the intersection of sections 107(a) and 113(f),58
the Court nonetheless concluded that “at least in the case of re-
imbursement, the PRP cannot choose the 6-year statute of limita-
tions for cost-recovery actions over the shorter limitations period
for § 113(f) contribution claims.”59
The Court gave even shorter shrift to the government’s argu-
ment that allowing PRPs to file suit under section 107(a)(4)(B)
might result in full recovery under principles of joint and several
liability, rather than the sort of equitable distribution contem-
plated under section 113(f)(1).60  First, it noted that this is not a
matter of the plaintiffs choosing between the two remedies; for
those who engage in voluntary cleanups, the Court stated, “[t]he
choice of remedies simply does not exist” because they cannot
bring contribution claims.61  More significantly, the Court deter-
mined that a defendant PRP in a section 107(a) suit may “blunt
any inequitable distribution of costs by filing a § 113(f) counter-
claim,” which “would necessitate the equitable apportionment of
costs among the liable parties, including the PRP that filed the
§ 107(a) action.”62
Turning to the potential impacts on contribution protection,
which was the point upon which the government placed its heavi-
est reliance at oral argument,63 the Court summarily concluded
that cost-recovery claims are not barred under the literal terms of
section 113(f)(2).64  The Court was not deterred by this, however.
It simply indicated why it found this outcome not to be as troub-
ling as the government did:
For several reasons, we doubt this supposed loophole would
discourage settlement.  First, as stated above, a defendant PRP
57 Id.  at 2338.
58 Id. at 2338 n.6; see also infra Part IV.
59 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2338; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
60 Id.  at 2338-39.
61 Id.  at 2339.
62 Id. (citations omitted).
63 See  Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22, Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. 2331 (No.
06-562) (where the government’s lawyer, Thomas Hungar, argued that “the first and
foremost way in which the sky is falling is that the court of appeals approach, Re-
spondent’s approach would eviscerate the settlement bar”); see also id.  at 52 (where
Justice Scalia refers to this as the government’s “principal argument”).
64 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2339.
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may trigger equitable apportionment by filing a § 113(f) coun-
terclaim.  A district court applying traditional rules of equity
would undoubtedly consider any prior settlement as part of
the liability calculus.  Second, the settlement bar continues to
provide significant protection from contribution suits by PRPs
that have inequitably reimbursed the costs incurred by an-
other party.  Third, settlement carries the inherent benefit of
finally resolving liability as to the United States or a State.65
Finally, in a footnote, the Court determined that since it was
recognizing an express right of action for PRPs in section 107(a),
there was no need for it to address whether that provision also
provides an implied right of contribution for PRPs who are ineli-
gible for relief under section 113(f).66
III
A CRITIQUE
As an exercise in statutory interpretation, Justice Thomas’
opinion was short and to-the-point.  Its brevity is perhaps unsur-
prising, given both the straightforward thrust of the statutory
provisions and the clear consensus that existed in the Court.67
More importantly, the Court is correct, for both the reasons it
set forth and many others.  In this latter regard, for example, the
structural parallels between subsections 107(a)(4)(A) and (B)
are even more extensive than the Court lets on.  In addition to
the symmetries noted by the Court, both subparagraphs create
causes of action, albeit in different sets of parties, with the poten-
tial defendants being named before the plaintiffs.  Moreover,
both refer to the same categories of costs, and both use the same
passive verb formulation, “incurred by.”68  Additionally, the nat-
ural understanding of the “any other person” language in section
107(a)(4)(B) is further underscored by the use of the phrase
65 Id.  (citation and footnote omitted).
66 Id.  at 2339 n.8.
67 The extent of this consensus was revealed at oral argument, where all of the
Justices who spoke (Justice Thomas was the only Justice who did not speak) ex-
pressed some degree of skepticism about the government’s interpretation.  Two
comments from Justices whom one might have expected to be friendly to the gov-
ernment’s position are illustrative.  Chief Justice Roberts characterized the govern-
ment’s reading, and its subsequent defense thereof, as “glid[ing] over” a “great
[structural] difficulty” and, by contrast, termed Atlantic Research’s argument as re-
flecting “the most natural reading” of the statute.  Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 63, at 9.  And for his part, Justice Scalia referred to the government’s
reading of the term “other” as “strange.” Id.  at 52.
68 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (2006).
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“other person” in section 111(a) of CERCLA, where, again, the
contrast is between governmental entities and “other
person[s].”69
Beyond these basic statutory dynamics, the government’s read-
ing of section 107(a)(4)(B) suffered from serious problems with
respect to both how it would have worked and what its effect
would have been.  While the Court’s opinion touched only on the
second of these concerns, the Court was aware of them both.
And there was more to the second of these concerns than the
opinion demonstrates.
Perhaps the best way to begin discussing these problems is to
start with the simple statement that the vast majority of private
parties who clean up contaminated property either own the prop-
erty or operate a business thereon, or both.  Indeed, as was men-
tioned at oral argument,70 in writing its amicus brief in Atlantic
Research , the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
researched all CERCLA cases reported on Westlaw between the
years 1995 and 2000.  In so doing, it identified 210 private-party
cases where cost recovery would be at issue (because they in-
volved situations that did not meet the requirements of section
113(f)).71  Of these, only one involved a plaintiff that, it ap-
peared, would not clearly qualify as either an owner and/or an
operator under section 107(a).72
69 Section 111(a) speaks to the uses to which monies in the Hazardous Substance
Superfund (Fund) may be put.  Subsection 111(a)(1) specifies that these monies may
be used for the “[p]ayment of governmental response costs incurred pursuant to
[§ 104] . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(1).  By contrast, section 111(a)(2) provides that
these funds may also be made available for costs incurred by “any other person,” so
long as the costs are approved by the responsible federal official.  42 U.S.C.
§ 9611(a)(2).  There is simply no hint that the phrase “other person” is meant to
exclude anyone other than the governmental entities who are covered already under
the prior provision.  Indeed, Congress acted on the assumption that PRPs are “other
person[s]” under this language when it enacted section 106(b)(2)(D), in which it
provided that even those unilateral-order recipients who prove to be liable under
section 107 are sometimes entitled to reimbursement from the Fund after they com-
ply with those orders.  42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(D); see also  Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush,
946 F.2d 918, 929 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., dissenting).
70 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at 35 (argument of Owen T. Arm-
strong, counsel for Atlantic Research).
71 See  NRDC Brief, supra note 11, at 420 n.12.
72 Id.  An argument could be made that even the plaintiff involved in the 210th
case may have qualified as an “operator” under section 107(a)(1). See  Ohm
Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1577-78 (5th Cir. 1997)
(brought by a cleanup contractor).
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In Atlantic Research , the Supreme Court correctly noted that
the fact that virtually all those who engage in voluntary cleanups
qualify as either owners or operators means that they meet the
prima facie elements of liability under section 107(a)(1), regard-
less of whether they played any role in causing the relevant con-
tamination.73  This dynamic, of course, raises the very concern
that, in the end, troubled the Court (i.e. , that “accepting the
Government’s interpretation would reduce the number of poten-
tial plaintiffs to almost zero, rendering § 107(a)(4)(B) a dead
letter.”).74
The government’s response to this problem was basically to ar-
gue that those who come within either CERCLA’s defenses
(such as the innocent landowner defense)75 or its liability exclu-
sions (such as the prospective purchaser exclusion)76 could still
bring claims under section 107(a)(4)(B).77  This solution, how-
ever, suffers from several problems.  First, the government never
gave a convincing explanation as to how issues relating to a
would-be cost-recovery plaintiff’s liability would be resolved.  At
the time such a plaintiff files a section 107 claim, the plaintiff
would of course be presumed to be innocent in the eyes of the
law, regardless of any interest it might have in the contaminated
property.  This is so because there is simply nothing in either
CERCLA or any other law that requires such a plaintiff to self-
identify as a liable party under section 107 at the time it files its
complaint.  An obvious corollary is that the defendant in any
such action would have the burden of both pleading and proof on
any issues relating to the plaintiff’s liability.78
Given this presumption of innocence, the question arises as to
how the defendant would put the plaintiff’s liability at issue.  Pre-
sumably, the defendant would try to raise it as a defense.  But
73 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2336-37.
74 Id.  at 2337.
75 See  42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(b)(3), 9601(35) (2006).
76 See  42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(r), 9601(40).
77 Brief for the United States at 15-16, Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. 2331 (No. 06-562)
(regarding the prospective purchaser defense); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 63, at 6-9 (argument of Thomas Hungar, counsel for the United States regard-
ing those to whom he refers as “so-called innocent person[s] under the statute”).
78 This, of course, is consistent with how tort law deals with the issue of the plain-
tiff’s potential role in contributing to its own injuries; that is, the defendant generally
bears the burden of both pleading and proof with respect to defenses such as con-
tributory and comparative negligence. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 198,
at 493 (West Group 2000).
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could this be done consistently with section 107(a), which indi-
cates that liability under that section is subject only to the de-
fenses in section 107(b)?79  When several of the justices raised
this procedural awkwardness at oral argument,80 the best the
government could do was to argue that “the court could obvi-
ously structure the issues as it saw fit but certainly [the innocence
of the person who was bringing the action] would be one of the
issues in the case . . . .”81  Regardless, the plain truth is that noth-
ing in CERCLA seems to contemplate an unstated affirmative
defense having nothing to do with the defendant’s connection to
either the site or the contamination thereof.
On the substantive question regarding who, in the end, could
bring a cost-recovery suit under the government’s reading of sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B), the Court’s responses, though brief, spoke
volumes.  First, the Court highlighted the implausibility of relying
on later-enacted defenses or exclusions to interpret a provision—
section 107(a)(4)(B)—that has been in CERCLA since its initial
enactment.82  And second, the Court correctly noted that the
government’s interpretation would, in any event, “reduce the
number of potential plaintiffs to almost zero.”83  Again, this con-
clusion is certainly supported by NRDC’s research.84  It is also
worth pointing out that, despite arguing that its interpretation
would have left section 107(a)(4)(B) with substantial operative
effect, the government failed to cite a single case in which a land-
owner (or anyone else) had filed and successfully prosecuted an
action under its reading of that provision.85
79 See  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
80 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at 6-10.
81 Id.  at 8.
82 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2337 n.4 (“[I]t would be implausible at best to con-
clude that § 107(a)(4)(B) lay dormant until the enactment of § 107(r)(1) in 2002.”).
While Justice Thomas mentioned only the prospective purchaser exclusion, and not
the innocent landowner defense, this is presumably because the government did not
mention the latter defense in its briefs.  Congress created the innocent landowner
defense in 1986, as part of SARA.  Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 9601 (2006)).  Hence, the same logic applies—the fact that Congress en-
acted these defenses well after it created section 107(a)(4)(B) belies any argument
that the parties who might qualify for those defenses were those whom Congress had
in mind when it created the private right of cost recovery.
83 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2337.
84 See supra  text accompanying notes 70-72.
85 See  Brief for the United States, supra note 77, at 15-16.
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The Supreme Court was also on solid footing in its treatment
of the alleged tension between its reading of section 107(a)(4)(B)
and the later-enacted section 113(f).  As the Court pointed out,
nothing in section 113(f) suggests that Congress was using the
term “contribution” in a manner different from its traditional
common law meaning of a “tortfeasor’s right to collect from
others responsible for the same tort after the tortfeasor has paid
more than his or her proportionate share, the shares being deter-
mined as a percentage of fault.”86  Once one understands the dis-
tinctness of the legal theories underlying cost-recovery and
contribution actions, it becomes clear that the cost-recovery stat-
ute of limitations is the only one that can apply to voluntary
cleanups.
The Court’s analysis regarding a section 107(a)(4)(B) defen-
dant’s ability to preclude any possibility of joint and several lia-
bility by successfully bringing a counterclaim is also compelling.
The plain language of section 113(f)(1) allows for a claim against
“any other person who is liable or potentially liable under [sec-
tion 107]”;87 there is simply no reason why this language cannot
be read as the Court read it: to include counterclaims against
plaintiffs who may bear responsibility.  The government previ-
ously conceded that the statute worked this way when it invoked
section 107(a)(4)(A), despite its own potential liability at a given
site.88
The Court’s response regarding what the government termed
the evisceration of contribution protection89 is likely to be the
most controversial part of the opinion.  One reason it may be
controversial is that Justice Thomas took the issue on despite the
fact that, technically speaking, it was not before the Court.  The
defendant, the United States, had not entered into a prior settle-
86 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2337-38 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 353
(8th ed. 1999)).  Here also, the tort analogy discussed is instructive. See supra  note
78.  Again, under tort law one who may bear partial responsibility for her own harm
need not sue in contribution. See DOBBS, supra  note 78, §§ 197-98, at 491-94.  In-
stead, she may sue anyone else who may bear responsibility for her harm for full
recovery. See id.  The defendant in any such action generally would then bear the
burden of both pleading and proof with respect to defenses such as contributory and
comparative negligence. Id.  § 198, at 494.
87 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2006).
88 United States v. Chrysler Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 849, 860-61 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
89 See Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2337; see also  Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 63, at 21-22 (oral argument of Thomas Hungar, counsel for the govern-
ment), and Brief for the United States, supra note 77, at 31.
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ment and hence, had no claim to contribution protection.90  The
second reason is that, as will be seen below, the Court’s logic
could lead to dramatic, real-world consequences that could upset
the expectations of some settling parties.
The first of these criticisms is probably valid, although it is easy
to see why the Court weighed in with such definitive language
(“[t]he settlement bar does not by its terms protect against cost-
recovery liability under § 107(a)”)91 given that the government
placed such heavy reliance on this proverbial gorilla in the closet.
It is even easier when one considers how readily this conclusion
flows from the rest of the Court’s discussion emphasizing the sep-
arateness and distinctness of CERCLA’s cost-recovery and con-
tribution remedies.  The Court is indisputably correct that section
113(f)(2) protects settling parties only from claims based in con-
tribution.  Thus, once one recognizes that section 107(a)(4)(B)
claims do not sound in contribution, it becomes obvious that set-
tling parties may still be exposed to cost-recovery claims.
To understand the potential real-world consequences, it may
help to imagine a hypothetical in which the EPA deems two par-
ties, Company A and Company B, to be equally responsible for
having caused a $20 million contamination problem.  Imagine
further that Company A voluntarily remediated half of the con-
tamination at a cost of $10 million, and that the EPA then en-
tered into a settlement with Company B, pursuant to which
Company B agreed to complete the final $10 million worth of
cleanup measures in exchange for contribution protection re-
garding the entire cleanup.  And finally, imagine that Company
A then sues Company B under section 107(a)(4)(B), arguing that
Company B should bear more than half of the cleanup costs.
In line with the above, Justice Thomas’ first response to this
hypothetical would be to concede that Company A has a cause of
action against Company B under section 107(a)(4)(B) and that
this cause of action is not subject to the contribution-protection
bar in section 113(f)(2).92  He couples this, however, with the
conclusion that once Company B raises the issue of Company
A’s liability through a counterclaim, the “district court applying
90 See Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2335; see also  Atl. Research Corp. v. United
States, 459 F.3d 827, 829-30 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted , 127 S. Ct. 1144 (2007), and
aff’d , 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
91 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2339.
92 See id.
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traditional rules of equity would undoubtedly consider any prior
settlement as part of the liability calculus.”93  While this seems
correct, it may be of small consolation to Company B, which now
has to both defend against a lawsuit and, in the course of that
defense, convince the court of the appropriateness of EPA’s view
that Company B should only bear half the cleanup costs.  While,
in many cases, the court may conclude that Company B has paid
its fair share, this outcome would not be a foregone conclusion in
all cases.  Moreover, Company B will at a minimum need to pay
its defense costs, which would be either non-existent or greatly
reduced if contribution protection were applicable.
Having said all this, this author keeps coming back to the fact
that, dictum though it may be, the Court’s conclusion is indispu-
tably correct.  Contribution protection is what it is—protection
against contribution claims.94  I will have a few more words to
say about the extent to which the lower courts are likely to apply
this conclusion in Part IV.  In the meantime, I will note only that
the text of section 113(f)(2) always has revealed that its protec-
tion is less than absolute.  Not only is it limited to contribution
claims, but even where it applies, section 113(f)(2) extends only
to matters addressed in the settlement.95  Significantly, the gov-
ernment consistently has conceded that, in many cases, it would
be unfair for it to characterize cleanup costs incurred by others as
matters addressed.96  The government also has conceded that the
courts can review such characterizations as part of their fairness
93 See id.
94 For whatever it is worth, the government actually agreed with the Court that
contribution protection has no effect on section 107(a) claims (although it disagreed
as to the consequences that should flow from this conclusion).  In the government’s
Reply Brief, for example, it conceded that those to whom it referred as “non-settling
sovereigns” and “‘innocent’ private parties” would not be bound by any contribu-
tion protection provisions the EPA or a state might have granted under section
113(f)(2) when the former entities proceed under either section 107(a)(4)(A) or (B),
respectively.  Reply Brief for the United States at 16 n.8, Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct.
2331 (No. 06-562).  By “non-settling sovereign,” the United States presumably was
referring to any sovereign other than the one which doled out the contribution pro-
tection.  By “innocent” private party, the government meant one that has no liability
itself under CERCLA.
95 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2006).
96 Memorandum from Bruce S. Gelber, Deputy Chief, Envtl. Enforcement Sec-
tion, Env’t & Natural Res. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Sandra L. Conners, Dir.,
Reg’l Support Div., Office of Site Remediation Enforcement, U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, to all EES Attorneys and Paralegals 4-5 (Mar. 4, 1997), available at  http://
www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/defin-cersett-mem.
pdf.
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analysis when the signatories to any such settlements move to
have them entered as consent decrees.97
Finally, it is worth noting that, although the Court’s opinion
was short and to-the-point, Justice Thomas had several other
strong arguments upon which he could have drawn, and which
lend further support to the correctness of the Court’s result.  For
example, while the government bemoaned the perceived struc-
tural tension between the Court’s reading of section 107(a)(4)(B)
and section 113(f), it ignored the fact that its reading of section
107(a)(4)(B) would have led to a far greater structural problem.
Although Atlantic Research  did not pose the issue of what claim
or claims those who receive unilateral orders under section 106
may have against other PRPs, it seems evident that under the
government’s interpretation they would have had none.  Their li-
ability status would preclude any cost-recovery claims under sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B), and the absence of a settlement would
preclude any contribution claims under section 113(f)(3)(B).98
Moreover, it appears highly unlikely that they would have any
contribution claims under section 113(f)(1).  This is so because
EPA-issued unilateral orders under section 106 are in all likeli-
hood not “civil action[s] under section 9606 . . . or under section
9607(a).”99  If not, section 113(f)(1) simply would not apply.
Thus, if the government had prevailed in Atlantic Research , the
result would have been a strange dichotomy.  It would allow a
party who enters into either a judicial or administrative settle-
ment with the EPA to have a contribution claim under section
113(f)(3)(B).  But, a party to whom the EPA issued a unilateral
order would have had no claim at all.  It seems highly unlikely
that Congress would have intended for the EPA’s choice as to
97 Id. ; see also  Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 766-67 & n.7 (7th
Cir. 1994) (deeming cleanup work Akzo undertook prior to the entry of the relevant
consent decree not to be a “covered matter” thereunder).
98 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(B), 9613(f)(3)(B).
99 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).  Section 122(g)(1) suggests as much by establishing a
juxtaposition between “administrative or civil action under section 9606 or 9607.”
42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1); see also  BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 127 S. Ct. 638, 648
(2006) (deeming an administrative order not to be an “action” under the Mineral
Leasing Act).  It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court mentioned the exis-
tence of the issue under CERCLA in Cooper Industries , but declined to address it.
543 U.S. 157, 167 n.5 (2004).
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how to exercise its enforcement discretion to have such drastic
consequences.100
The correctness of the Court’s result draws further support
from the legislative history of both CERCLA and SARA.  When
it first passed CERCLA, Congress had two interrelated goals: to
promote cleanup activities and to “assur[e] that those who
caused chemical harm bear the costs of that harm . . . .”101  With
respect to promoting cleanup, Congress wanted to supplement
governmental efforts by “induc[ing] . . . potentially liable persons
to pursue appropriate environmental response actions volunta-
rily.”102  Moreover, in the context of private party cleanups, the
purposes of promoting cleanup and holding accountable those
responsible were linked.  As the Supreme Court previously rec-
ognized in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States , the purpose of pro-
viding for private cost recovery was “to encourage private parties
to assume the financial responsibility of cleanup by allowing
them to seek recovery from others.”103
In passing SARA, Congress made no changes to the relevant
portions of section 107.104  Given that, it is unsurprising that no
legislative history bearing directly on section 107(a)(4)(B) exists.
SARA, however, does have legislative history relating to the
ability of those who bear potential liability under the statute to
100 The jarring nature of this anomaly is brought further into focus when one con-
siders that, given the frequent applicability of joint and several liability under CER-
CLA, (see, e.g. , O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 183 (1st Cir. 1989)) the EPA often
would have the power to issue a unilateral order requiring one out of perhaps doz-
ens of PRPs to implement an entire remedy, even though these remedies often in-
volve tens of millions of dollars in response costs.  Under the government’s reading
of section 107(a)(4)(B), the recipient of such an order would have had no way to
spread the costs of such a cleanup among the other jointly and severally liable PRPs.
The EPA’s settlement leverage, which has always been great under the statute (see,
e.g. , 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3)) will have been truly breathtaking if it could threaten at
any time to issue any jointly and severally liable PRP a unilateral order depriving it
of any recourse against other PRPs.
101 S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 13 (1980); see also  United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d
1506, 1514 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing “Congress’s twin goals of cleaning up pollution . . .
and of assigning responsibility to culpable parties”).
102 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 33 (1980); see also S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 31 (“This
liability standard is intended to induce potentially liable persons to voluntarily miti-
gate damages rather than simply rely on the government to abate hazards.”).
103 Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 n.13 (1994) (quoting FMC
Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 847 (10th Cir. 1993)).
104 See  Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, § 107, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006)).
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bring cost-recovery actions.  Specifically, the House Energy and
Conference Committee stated:
[Section 113(f)] does not affect the right of the United States
to maintain a cause of action for cost recovery under Section
107 or injunctive relief under Section 106, whether or not the
U.S. was an owner or operator of a facility or a generator of
waste at the site.105
Read fairly, this statement supports two important propositions:
first, that the Committee agreed with the unanimous case law
that one’s potential liability should not preclude one from using
section 107(a) to seek cost recovery; and second, that section
113(f) should not be read as eviscerating this authority.
In the end, one can only conclude that Atlantic Research  was
correctly decided.  The Court’s unanimity only serves to under-
score one’s sense of wonder at how so many lower courts got it
wrong the first time around.
IV
REMAINING ISSUES
Taken together, Cooper Industries  and Atlantic Research  re-
solve many important issues regarding the nature and viability of
private-party cleanup claims under CERCLA.  Still, however,
the opinions leave several significant issues unresolved.  As pre-
viously mentioned, one of these unresolved issues may be the
question of whether a settling party to whom the government has
given contribution protection under section 113(f)(2) may be
sued by those who otherwise have valid cost-recovery claims.106
Again, while the Court spoke definitively on this question by
stating “[t]he settlement bar does not by its terms protect against
cost-recovery liability under § 107(a),”107 the issue, as Justice
Ginsburg pointed out at oral argument, technically was not
before the Court because the defendant in the case, the United
States, had received no contribution protection.108  Still, it seems
likely that the lower courts will follow the Supreme Court’s gui-
dance for three reasons: (1) it was carefully considered; (2) it
105 H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, at 79-80 (1985).
106 See supra  text accompanying notes 86-88.
107 United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 (2007).
108 See  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at 33 (colloquy between Jus-
tice Ginsburg and Owen T. Armstrong, counsel for Atlantic Research).
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constituted an important component of the Court’s analysis; and,
perhaps most importantly, (3) it is correct.109
In order to understand what other issues these two opinions
leave unresolved, it may help to consider the categories of poten-
tial plaintiffs who may seek to rely on CERCLA to impose some,
or all, of their cleanup costs on others.  By my count, there are at
least seven such categories:
(1) those who voluntarily clean up contamination despite the
fact that they bear no potential liability under section 107;
(2) those who do the same despite bearing potential liability
under the statute;
(3) those who either are being or have been sued under
CERCLA;
(4) those who have entered into either a judicial or adminis-
trative settlement with either the EPA or a state that quali-
fies under section 113(f)(3)(B);
(5) those who remediate sites pursuant to EPA-issued unilat-
eral orders under section 106;
(6) those who either are being or have been compelled to
clean up a site under either state law or a federal law other
than CERCLA, through some mechanism other than a
settlement (e.g., a unilateral order or a judicial decree);
and
(7) those who have been compelled to reimburse either a state
or a private party for cleanup costs in a state-law-based
judicial action that did not result in a consent decree.
Atlantic Research  and Cooper Industries  speak most clearly to
the first four of those categories.  On its face, Atlantic Research
dealt only with the second category—PRPs (like Atlantic Re-
search) who voluntarily clean up sites and then sue others to col-
lect some or all of their cleanup costs.110  But both the parties
and the Court assumed that those potential plaintiffs in the first
category (to the extent that they exist) would have claims under
section 107(a)(4)(B), and one can safely assume that issue is set-
109 See, e.g. , In re  Troff, 488 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gaylor v.
United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996)) (court considered itself “bound by
Supreme Court dicta almost as by the Court’s outright holdings”); McCoy v. Mass.
Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[F]ederal appellate courts are bound
by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright
holdings, particularly when, as here, a dictum is of recent vintage and not enfeebled
by any subsequent statement.”).
110 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2335.
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tled.111  Similarly, while neither case actually dealt with someone
in either the third or fourth categories (those who either have
been sued under CERCLA or who have entered into qualifying
settlements), both decisions operate on the basic assumption that
the potential plaintiffs in these categories will at least have con-
tribution claims under subsections 113(f)(1) and (f)(3)(B),
respectively.112
Two interesting issues remain, however, regarding the third
and fourth categories.  In Atlantic Research , Justice Thomas spe-
cifically noted that some of the potential plaintiffs who appear to
qualify for contribution claims under section 113(f)(1) and/or
section 113(f)(3)(B) also have arguable claims for cost recov-
ery.113  The Court, however, saw no need to resolve this potential
overlap:
[W]e recognize that a PRP may sustain expenses pursuant to a
consent decree following a suit under § 106 or § 107(a).  In
such a case, the PRP does not incur costs voluntarily but does
not reimburse the costs of another party.  We do not decide
whether these compelled costs of response are recoverable
under § 113(f), § 107(a), or both.114
Thus, the lower courts will need to revisit this issue in light of
Atlantic Research .  To date, when faced with this overlap, the
courts have favored the specificity of section 113(f) over the gen-
eral cost-recovery authority in section 107(a)(4)(B).115  In so do-
ing, they have been motivated by their perception that the claims
under section 113(f) fit within the classic definition of what con-
tribution is all about.116  It may be that Atlantic Research  will
lead them to conclude that these potential plaintiffs can choose
between the various provisions.  What seems certain, at least, is
that “none of the above” is not an option.  The real question is
which provisions are available to these settling parties, not
whether they have a claim at all.
The second extant issue regarding the third and fourth catego-
ries, as I have denominated them, relates to the proper identifica-
tion of the potential plaintiffs who should fit within the fourth
111 See id.  at 2336.
112 This statement is subject to a slight qualification based on the issue discussed
in the two immediately-following paragraphs.
113 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2338 n.6.
114 Id.  (citations omitted).
115 See, e.g. , Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (1998).
116 See, e.g. , id.
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category.  Section 113(f)(3)(B) confers a right of contribution on
“[any] person who has resolved its liability to the United States
or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or all
of the costs of such action in an administrative or judicially ap-
proved settlement . . . .”117
On its face, this language appears to create an extremely broad
right of contribution in all those who have resolved their cleanup
liabilities through settlements with either the EPA or the states,
regardless of whether the settlements required the settling par-
ties to undertake cleanup actions or reimburse the relevant sov-
ereigns for cleanup costs.  Moreover, this right appears to apply
regardless of whether the relevant settlement occurs under the
auspices of CERCLA or some other federal or state law.  The
conclusion that settlements under both federal and state law
qualify is strongly suggested by the fact that while section
113(f)(3)(B) on its face contemplates that it applies to state-gen-
erated administrative settlements, CERCLA itself gives the
states no power to enter into such settlements.118
The Second Circuit muddied the waters on this second issue in
the Consolidated Edison  case.  In an otherwise exemplary opin-
ion, the court indicated that section 113(f)(3)(B) creates “a con-
tribution right only when liability for CERCLA claims, rather
than some broader category of legal claims, is resolved.”119  The
court defended this conclusion by explaining that “[it] seems
clear because resolution of liability for ‘response action[s]’ is a
prerequisite to a section 113(f)(3)(B) suit—and a ‘response ac-
tion’ is a CERCLA-specific term describing an action to clean up
a site or minimize the release of contaminants in the future.”120
In this author’s view, the Second Circuit’s analysis is problem-
atic.  It ignores that section 113(f)(3)(B) itself contemplates that
it applies to state settlements.  Additionally, the Second Circuit’s
opinion places too much stock in the use of the term “response
action.”121  In that regard, the court’s logic is directly contrary to
117 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2006).
118 Compare  42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (giving the EPA, but not the states, the authority
to issue unilateral orders), and  § 9622(g)(4) (authorizing the EPA, but not the
states, to enter into administrative cost-recovery settlements in limited circum-
stances), with  § 9607(a)(4)(A) (authorizing both the EPA and the states to file judi-
cial cost-recovery actions).
119 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2005).
120 Id.  at 95-96.
121 See id.
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the Third Circuit’s analysis on a conceptually identical issue in
United States v. Rohm & Haas Co .122  There, the court dealt with
the question of whether certain EPA oversight activities qualified
as a removal action for cost-recovery purposes, despite the fact
that the EPA had undertaken them under the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA).123  In holding that they did
constitute a removal action, the court concluded its analysis as
follows:
We find no support in the text or legislative history of CER-
CLA for the suggestion that identical oversight activity on the
part of the government should be considered a removal if the
government invokes CERCLA, but not a removal if other
statutory authority is invoked.  Moreover, given the similarity
of the provisions of RCRA and CERCLA authorizing EPA to
order private parties to conduct corrective expenses, we fail to
perceive any reason why Congress might have wished to make
government oversight expenses recoverable if the government
invoked CERCLA statutory authority, but not if it invoked
RCRA.124
While the Rohm & Haas  analysis seems more compelling than
the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Consolidated Edison , the latter
case at least guarantees that there will be further litigation on this
front in the context of both state settlements entered into under
state law (as in Consolidated Edison) and EPA settlements under
non-CERCLA laws (e.g., under RCRA).125
122 United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled by
United States v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005).
123 Id.  at 1274-76.
124 Id.  at 1275.
125 At some level, the court’s mistake in Consolidated Edison  (if it was a mistake)
generated a “no harm, no foul” situation, because the court wound up deeming Con-
solidated Edison eligible to recover under section 107(a).  Consol. Edison Co. of
N.Y. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2005).  In this vein, Consoli-
dated Edison  reveals that it can be difficult to determine which of my categories a
particular plaintiff may fit within.  The plaintiff in Consolidated Edison  entered into
a “Voluntary Cleanup Agreement” with the state, pursuant to which the plaintiff
would receive a “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” (covering state law claims) if it
satisfactorily completed the cleanup. Id.  at 95-96.  There is no indication in the
opinion, however, that Consolidated Edison was bound to implement the remedy.
As is often the case, the opinion reads as if the worst that would happen to the
company if it did not follow through is that it would not receive the desired release.
Seen in this light, the Consolidated Edison  court may very well have been correct to
treat the case as one that should have been brought under section 107(a).  Still,
however, the court’s analysis regarding the need for state settlements to resolve
CERCLA liabilities in order to qualify under section 113(f)(3)(B) is troubling.  Pre-
sumably, the Second Circuit would apply the same analysis to one who has entered
into a more traditional, binding consent agreement.  If such a party does not fit into
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In Atlantic Research , neither the parties nor the Court ap-
peared to give much consideration to anyone in the fifth, sixth or
seventh categories I described above.  Earlier, the Court in
Cooper Industries  observed that the question remained whether
those potential plaintiffs in the fifth category (those who receive
unilateral orders from the EPA under section 106) have contribu-
tion claims under section 113(f)(1), as that case did not involve
the recipient of such an order.126  Nonetheless, the Court de-
clined to address the merits of that question.127
As previously mentioned, this author believes that the poten-
tial plaintiffs who have received unilateral orders under section
106 have weak arguments under section 113(f)(1).128  It seems
unlikely that the issuance of a unilateral order under section 106
would be a civil action within the meaning of section 113(f)(1).
The order recipients likely have stronger claims, however, under
section 107(a).  They will have incurred actual expenses on re-
sponse costs.  Additionally, unlike those who have incurred re-
sponse costs under consent decrees, they do not have more
specific claims under section 113(f) (at least assuming as much
for present purposes).  Finally, it would be quite strange if the
EPA could deprive someone of recourse against other PRPs to
which they would otherwise be entitled under Atlantic Research
merely by issuing them a unilateral order.129
The chief characteristics of the potential plaintiffs in my sixth
category are: (1) they were forced to clean up the site (which
takes them out of my first two categories); (2) they were not sued
under CERCLA (which takes them out of the third); (3) they
have not settled (which takes them out of the fourth); and (4) the
legal force that was used to require their cleanup measures came
from something other than section 106 (which takes them out the
fifth).  In terms of how they fit into the statute, they would seem
to be conceptually identical to those in my fifth category, with
my fourth category (i.e., those who have claims under section 113(f)(3)(B)), it would
seem that the closest fit would be the sixth category, which would include, among
others, those who have received state-issued unilateral orders.  While courts may be
likely to decide that those who fit that profile have claims under section
107(a)(4)(B), if I were representing such a party in a different circuit (i.e. other than
the Second), I would prefer that my client had a clear claim to contribution under
section 113(f)(3)(B) than a possible cost-recovery claim under section 107(a)(4)(B).
126 Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 168 & n.5 (2004).
127 Id.  at 168 n.5.
128 See supra  note 99 and accompanying text.
129 See supra  note 100 and accompanying text.
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the sole difference being that these parties were forced to clean
up the site under either state law or a different federal law.  Also,
it would seem odd if these parties had less of a claim to cost re-
covery as compared to potential plaintiffs, like Atlantic Re-
search, who engaged in voluntary cleanups.
The central question relating to the potential plaintiffs in both
my fifth and sixth categories is whether voluntariness is a key
element of the Atlantic Research  Court’s section 107(a)(4)(B)
analysis.  Although Atlantic Research  itself did involve a volun-
tary cleanup, the voluntary nature of the company’s activities
seemed to play almost no role in the Court’s analysis.  Further,
although the Court mentioned the absence of voluntariness when
it discussed the uncertainty regarding the claims of those who
clean up pursuant to consent decrees, it gave no indication that
this absence would pose difficulties under section
107(a)(4)(B).130  The Court’s lack of focus on voluntariness is, of
course, fully consistent with section 107(a)(4)(B), which simply
contains no voluntariness element.131  Thus, the language of sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B) itself suggests that those in my fifth and sixth
categories should be treated in the same fashion as those who
engage in voluntary cleanups.
Lastly, there is the seventh category: potential plaintiffs who
have been compelled under a state law to reimburse either a
state or a private party for cleanup expenses, and who did not
negotiate a settlement.  These parties seem to be in the most ten-
uous situation, as compared to the parties in the other categories.
Atlantic Research  clearly indicates that those who have reim-
bursed others for cleanup expenses cannot pursue a cost-recov-
ery claim: “by reimbursing response costs paid by other parties,
the PRP has not incurred its own costs of response and therefore
cannot recover under § 107(a).”132  The fact that they have not
been sued under either section 106 or section 107 precludes any
application of section 113(f)(1).  The fact that they do not have a
settlement precludes any application of section 113(f)(3).  Thus,
it is likely that they are simply out of luck under CERCLA, at
least in terms of explicit statutory claims.
This result seems slightly counter-intuitive, especially if those
who have entered into state-law-based, cost-recovery settlements
130 United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2338 n.6 (2007).
131 See  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2006).
132 Atl. Research , 127 S. Ct. at 2338.
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with states have a right of contribution under section
113(f)(3)(B).133  Nonetheless, it would seem that the best argu-
ment that those in this position could advance is that there is an
implied contribution claim in section 107, an argument that the
Court declined to address in both Cooper Industries  and Atlantic
Research , but about which it expressed skepticism in the earlier
of the two opinions.134
V
CONCLUSION
The position that the United States took in Atlantic Research
was stark indeed.  If the Supreme Court had accepted it, it would
have been the death knell for CERCLA’s application at any
other than the very highest priority sites, which are the only sites
with respect to which the EPA and the states tend to file CER-
CLA-based judicial actions (thus triggering section 113(f)).  For-
tunately, the Supreme Court did not go down this road.  Instead,
it read section 107(a)(4)(B) to be what it is—a straightforward
grant of cost-recovery authority in any and all private parties that
have incurred cleanup costs.
The Court’s opinion in Atlantic Research  will reverberate for
years, as lower courts backtrack to conform their analyses to its
teachings.  The central lesson of Atlantic Research  is clear: those
who voluntarily address contamination have claims against
others who may be liable under section 107, regardless of
whether they may also be caught in CERCLA’s liability web.  At
the margins, its lessons are a little less clear.  Both its logic and its
spirit would seem to suggest that anyone who has undertaken
cleanup measures, as opposed to having reimbursed someone
else for having done so, should have a basis for recovery under
CERCLA.  In most cases, this claim will be best grounded in sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B).  For those parties who clean up either after
having been sued under CERCLA or after having entered into a
qualifying settlement, their claim may best be grounded in sec-
tion 113(f).  In any case, the most important conclusion is that
these parties have claims.  As such, their incentives to engage in
cleanup activities are maximized.
133 See supra  text accompanying notes 117-18.
134 Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170-71 (2004); Atl. Research ,
127 S. Ct. at 2339 n.8.
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